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The Case of British Sports Medicine
VANESSA HEGGIE*
Introduction: Sports Medicine and Specialism
Specialization in medicine acts to normalize categories of health and sickness that, once
constructed, can appear to be obvious and rational divisions of the body, of disease, or of
populations. While the earliest work on this topic, George Rosen’s sociologically informed
The specialization of medicine (1944), highlighted the role of medical theory in specialty
formation, historiansofmedicinesincethe1940shaveoverwhelminglyarguedthatmedical
specializationisbettercharacterizedasaneconomic, socialorpoliticalprocess.1 InBritain,
specialization, particularly in connection with the foundation of specialist hospitals, was
also a strategic approach taken by doctors competing in a vigorous medical marketplace
wheretheadvantagesofprofessionaladvancementthroughahospitalconsultancypostwere
monopolized by a tiny urban elite.2
George Weisz’s recent work on specialization also dismisses the idea that conceptual
models drove specialization.3 Yet he recognizes that medical theory did play a role in
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the internal justiﬁcations for specialisms—in other words, such justiﬁcations were used to
vindicatespecializationincertainareas, ratherthanexplainingwhyspecializationoccurred.
The turn away from holism in medicine allowed diseases to be located in speciﬁc organs,
tissues or cells, and so the division of medicine into specialties based on body region and
disease categories seemed a rational response to the needs of practitioners working (and
learning) in a ﬁeld where knowledge appeared to increase year after year.4 Reconsideration
of specialization in France also demonstrates that the form of specialties is dictated by the
“current state of knowledge, techniques, [and] institutions” while other inﬂuences drive the
process of specialization.5
So while the external motivations for specialization—economic competition, the needs
of rational management and health-care policy, and other social contexts—varied over the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the internal justiﬁcations tended to focus on reductive
understandings of disease causation. In the twentieth century these explanations were sup-
plemented by a focus on technological and treatment innovations.6 In this context, sports
medicine is an extremely unpromising ﬁeld to convert into a medical specialism. Sports
medicine is a holistic practice, covering everything from gross musculo-skeletal injuries to
dietary advice to genetic testing. It has virtually no unique diseases or injuries (one can get
tennis elbow cleaning ﬂoors) nor any unique treatment modalities or technologies.
Another way to deﬁne a specialism is to claim that the patient, rather than the disease or
the treatment, is in some way special. Paediatrics and geriatric medicine are justiﬁed on the
grounds that the very old and the very young are different from the “normal” body public.7
Obstetrics and gynaecology are at least in part based on the understanding that women’s
bodies are deviant.8 While sports medicine could not identify its patients conclusively by
age or gender, in the late 1940s and early 1950s sports medicine practitioners laid claim to
expert knowledge based on the athletic body, which was ﬁgured as quantitatively different
from the body public.9 The athlete was a discrete clinical object, a distinct patient group
for two reasons, one biomedical and one social. Physiologically athletes could appear quite
different from the “norms” of human life; they could have enlarged hearts, extremely low
resting pulse rates, delayed menses, and so on. All these physiological features could
mistakenly be interpreted as pathologies by inexperienced doctors. Secondly, the demands
of athletes differed from those of non-athletes. They (allegedly) required a faster return to
high levels of activity, and thus fuller functional repair, and they moved in the partly closed
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world of sport where they had to live by a different set of rules. They might be unable
to take certain drugs at certain times in the competitive season, and their treatments and
rehabilitation had to be negotiated through other professional groups, such as trainers, team
coaches and so on.
When the British Association of Sport (and Exercise) Medicine (hereafter BAS(E)M)
was formed in 1952, it aimed to become the “authoritative body on every medical aspect
of athletics and exercise”.10 “Athletics and exercise” quickly became interpreted to mean
elite and professional sport, and very little of the BAS(E)M’s work in the 1950s and 1960s
focusedonschoolorcommunitysports,orexerciseforhealthorleisure.AttheAssociation’s
ﬁrst provincial meeting, in Loughborough in 1961, the theme was “Are athletes different?”,
a question comprehensively answered with “yes” by all the papers delivered.11 Meanwhile
the executive committee of the BAS(E)M remained committed to sports medicine as an
area of expertise, not a formal specialism. Sports medicine was robustly interdisciplinary,
multi-practitioner, largely voluntary, and regulated through experience and enthusiasm.12
(It was, after all, an advantage for a sports doctor to have been an athlete him- or her-
self, a requirement of personal experience as a patient not applied to any other medical
specialism.)
The ﬁrst hints that this was to change appeared in the 1970s, and then with force in
the 1980s and 1990s as the leadership of the BAS(E)M began actively to campaign for
the formal recognition of sports medicine as a specialty in the UK, with a distinct career
path and consultant positions. Sport and exercise medicine was approved as a medical
specialty in the UK on 21 February 2005, entering the ofﬁcial register of specialties, the
Specialist Order, seven months later. For nearly thirty years the leading medical organ-
ization representing sports medicine practitioners had seen no need (at least according
to statements in their public records) for this sort of state-sanctioned specialization. This
article will discuss the events in the 1970s and 1980s that turned a multi-disciplinary,
elite, athlete-focused and experience-based model of expertise into the formalized,
academic,diploma-ledmedicalspecialtythatnowextendsintocommunitysportsandpublic
health.
As most previous studies of specialty formation have shown, a web of interrelated causes
can be credited with the shift in vision within sports medicine from the 1970s. Some of
these causes are economic, some social, and others political. But what makes the story of
sports medicine’s specialization particularly novel is the explicit way in which the internal
justiﬁcation for the specialty—the athletic body—became deeply problematic because of
changesintheculturalandsocio-politicalcontextinBritain. Anincreasingdemandfor, and
consumption of, sports and exercise services combined with a new public health focus on
10 The phrase “and exercise” was added in
1999; the adding of “exercise” to sports medicine
is discussed in more detail below. Papers of the
British Association of Sport and Exercise Medicine
(hereafter, BAS(E)M Papers), Annual General
Meeting, 27 Feb. 1953. These papers have been
deposited in Archives and Manuscripts, Wellcome
Library, under the classmark SA/BSM. I would
like to thank Dr Neil Carter for providing me with
copies.
11 Archives of the British Olympic Association,
BOA Headquarters, Wandsworth (hereafter, BOA
Archives), 34.2 MED INJUR, Proceedings of
meetings held at Loughborough Training College,
June 1961.
12 See, for example, this afﬁrmation of the rights
of “non-medical members” to sit on BAS(E)M’s
executive committee, vote, and hold ofﬁcial positions.
BAS(E)M Papers, SA/BSM/A/2/2, minutes of the
executive committee, 25 Sept. 1968.
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“lifestyle” to create government-backed interest in the relationship between leisure habits
andhealth.13 Inparticular,exercisebecameapossiblecureforsomeoftheemergentdiseases
of civilization, while at the same time being a cause of fresh injury and disability.14
A sports medicine which was based only on elite or professional sport would fail to
capitalize on these movements, and could be at risk of marginalization. British sports medi-
cine practitioners needed to reclaim the body public as part of their patient group, and did
so by adding “and exercise” to the deﬁnition of their area of expertise. In doing this they
also embraced the need for specialism as a necessary part of the process of protecting an
endangeredareaofexpertise. InthisarticleIwilloutlinetwoexamplesoftheexternalinﬂu-
ences which created the pressure to specialize. First, the Sports Council’s sports injuries
clinic scheme of the 1970s, which highlighted all the vulnerabilities of a sports medi-
cine based on deﬁnitions of the 1950s and 1960s; second, the economic and professional
pressures of insurance and medical representation, which became particularly problematic
inthe1980s.Astheseexternalfactorsdrovetheprocessofspecializationinsportsmedicine,
sotheinternaljustiﬁcationforthespecialtyalsohadtoshift. Astrongrhetoricwasproduced
describing exercise as a drug, which should be undertaken only with expert guidance; an
appeal was made for patients’ right as consumers—that is, the right of everyone, regardless
of their ability to pay—to access specialist sports medicine services; and an argument was
made about the need to protect patients from “quacks”.15
The Sports Council and Sports Medicine before 1972
The Sports Council was a signiﬁcant funder of sports medicine and sports science
activities from its establishment in 1965.16 One of its ﬁrst executive actions, before it
had even formed the committee which would subsequently handle science and medicine
grants (the Research and Statistics Committee), was to award £2,500 to a joint Medical
Research Council/British Olympic Association project to study the effect of altitude on
athletes in preparation for the 1968 Mexico City Olympiad.17 This keen interest in elite
and performance sport is indicative of the biomedical and scientiﬁc work of the Sports
Council; an interest which might seem odd as the Council was the direct brain-child of an
inquiry which was supposed to consider how sports “promo[ted] the general welfare of the
community”.18 The Wolfenden Committee on Sport was formed in 1957, and as one of
13 On the public health changes, see V Berridge,
‘Medicine and the public: the 1962 report of the Royal
College of Physicians and the new public health’,
Bull. Hist. Med., 2007, 81: 286–311; idem, ‘Medicine,
public health and the media in Britain from the
nineteen-ﬁfties to the nineteen-seventies’, Hist. Res.,
2009, 82: 360–73.
14 Vanessa Heggie, ‘A century of
cardiomythology: exercise and the heart
c.1880–1980’, Soc. Hist. Med., 2009 (online preview).
15 The second two justiﬁcations, an appeal to
equity and to public interest, are of course familiar
approaches to boundary formation in professions; they
are particularly highlighted in M J D Roberts, ‘The
politics of professionalization: MPs, medical men, and
the 1858 Medical Act’, Med. Hist., 2009, 53: 37–56.
16 The Sports Council in the period 1965–1972 is
sometimes referred to as the Advisory Sports Council,
to differentiate it from the Executive Sports Council,
which it became in 1972. Since the Council’s own
records consistently use the phrase “Sports Council”,
this is the one I use. Centre for Sports Science and
History, Birmingham University, Papers of the Sports
Council (hereafter, Sports Council Papers).
17 Vanessa Heggie, “‘Only the British appear to be
making a fuss”: the science of success and the myth of
amateurism at the Mexico Olympiad, 1968’, Sport in
History, 2008, 28: 213–35.
18 Wolfenden Committee on Sport, Sport and the
community, London, CCPR, 1960–1, p. 1.
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several recommendations published in 1960 it advised the formation of a body like the Arts
Council for sport, which could channel tax revenue into both community and performance
sports.
Of course, some Sports Council committees did give grants for non-elite sports activity,
but when it came to sports medicine and sports science the focus was deﬁnitely not at
the community level, at least until the 1970s. Between the ﬁnancial years 1965/6 and
1970/1, over 90 per cent of the Research and Statistics Committee’s funding was spent
either on basic physiological research (including training and facilities for research) or on
projects speciﬁcally focused on elite, professional and high-performance athletes.19 The
only exceptions to this rule were a small grant of £200 given to a project on the assessment
of ﬁtness in schoolchildren, and sponsorship of a project on the extent and treatment of
sports injuries run by Professor R C Browne, of the Department of Industrial Health at the
University of Newcastle.
The desire to undertake a survey of this sort was initially couched in terms which rein-
forced the idea of the athlete as clinically different. D D Molyneux, an academic based
in the Department of Physical Education at Birmingham University, wrote a consultation
paper for the Sports Council in 1967 on the topic of sports injuries. “There are a number
of reasons why sports injuries can justify separate consideration from other injuries”, he
argued, notably the fact that “[m]ost individuals who sustain injury through … sports parti-
cipation are anxious to return to their sport as quickly as possible.”20 (This is a particularly
strange justiﬁcation, as it implies, of course, that other patients are not anxious to return to
their normal activities “as quickly as possible”.) Further, “the doctor, the physiotherapist
and the trainer or coach” needed to work together to treat and rehabilitate the athlete.21
In other words, the athlete—as well as requiring special treatment—moves in a different
socialcontext, wherehistreatmenthastobenegotiatedthroughothermembersofthesports
community.
When this report was written, in 1967, the injured athlete had a range of options for
ﬁnding specialist sports medicine treatment. Those medical members of the BAS(E)M who
worked within the NHS found time to volunteer at local sports clubs or travel with the
Olympic squad. Others pursued specialism in related ﬁelds such as orthopaedic surgery or
cardiology, or took the Diploma in Physical Medicine, entering a specialty within which
they could focus on athletes. Only a few made sports medicine a source of private income,
as the paid medical ofﬁcers for professional Association Football teams, in county cricket
or in some other high income sports.22 There was at least one permanent clinic for athletes
within the NHS, based at the Middlesex Hospital (usually for one or two days a week) since
1947; in 1966 it treated “425 new patients and received 1,200 visits from ‘old’ patients in
follow up cases”.23 Other clinics effectively existed, but less formally as “[s]ome ortho-
paedic surgeons attached to various hospitals [became] known for their knowledge” and
19 Taken from the Sports Council’s own review of
expenditure: Sports Council Papers, SC(IR)(72)1.
20 Sports Council Papers, SC(RS)(67)17, ‘Sports
injuries—a general background to the position in
Britain’.
21 Ibid.
22 See various oral history accounts in L A
Reynolds and E M Tansey (eds), The development of
sports medicine in twentieth-century Britain: the
transcript of a Witness Seminar held by the Wellcome
Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL,
London, on 29 June 2007, London, Wellcome Trust,
2009.
23 Sports Council Papers, Appendix A to
SC(RS)(67)17, ‘The Middlesex Hospital Athletes’
Clinic’.
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therefore attracted a proportionally larger number of athletes and sports injuries to their
clinics.24 Likewise, medical practitioners who were acknowledged experts in particular
sports (especially boxing, rowing and swimming) or who had a paid position with football
and cricket teams often treated patients outside the sport or club as well.
So the purpose of the sports injuries survey which was initiated in 1969 was to gather a
statistical measure of all these varied medical interventions, and discover how many sports
injuries were being treated by generalists in accident and emergency or orthopaedic units.
It ran until 1972; that is, concurrently with the beginnings of the Sports Council’s Sports
Injuries Clinic (hereafter SIC) scheme. Opening clinics was essentially an extension of the
injuries survey, with standardized patient reports allowing broader statistical conclusions
to be drawn about sports injuries and their treatment. However, while the initial survey
was inspired by Molyneux’s claims for the special needs of the elite athlete, by the time a
report was prepared on sports injuries the Sports Council appeared keen to present them as
a “broad community problem”, whose patients were “ordinary club or casual players, of
socio-economic grade C1 … [m]any were students and school-children”.25
The reason for this shift in focus, although it is not made explicit, probably lies with
the reformation of the Sports Council in 1972, when it was recreated as an executive body.
As part of this process it absorbed some of the responsibilities and ﬁnances of the Central
Council of Physical Recreation (founded in 1935 as the Central Council of Recreative
PhysicalTraining). TheCCPRhadoriginatedoutoffearsaboutnationalﬁtnessintheinter-
war period, and had long focused on school sports and exercise for health and leisure.26
Inevitably the transfer of staff and responsibilities to the Sports Council led to some new
avenues of interest in community and leisure sport. Meanwhile, sports medicine became
established in the committee structure of the new Council: the chair of the Research and
StatisticsCommittee, RogerBannister(bothasportsmanandadoctor), becamethechairof
the whole Council, while the new chairmanship of the Research Committee went to Peter
McIntosh,thenakeyﬁgureintherunningandfoundingoftheInstituteofSportsMedicine.27
These adjustments of outlook and personnel overlapped with a shift in public health policy
in the UK, detailed elsewhere by Virginia Berridge.28 This more interventionist approach
focused on lifestyle reforms inevitably increased interest in the possible use of exercise and
sport to promote health.
In the following section I will outline the Sports Council’s Sports Injury Clinic scheme,
and show how it revealed sports medicine as a vulnerable medical specialty in the new
socio-political climate of the 1970s. While there is no evidence that this scheme was inten-
tionally threatening, and the undermining of British sports medicine’s internal justiﬁcation
for specialism may have been entirely accidental, it was the start of a period of external and
internalthreatandsubsequentreformwhichfundamentallychangedBritishsportsmedicine
into the formal specialty of Sport and Exercise Medicine.
24 Sports Council Papers, SC(RS)(67)17.
25 National Archives, Kew (hereafter NA),
MH166/1394, the Sports Council Pilot Study of Sport
Injury Clinics.
26 H Justin Evans, Service to sport: the story of the
CCPR, 1935–1975, London, Pelham for the Sports
Council, 1974; Barrie Houlihan, The government
and politics of sport, London, Routledge, 1991,
pp. 86–91.
27 The Institute of Sports Medicine was founded
in 1963 as the “academic” wing of British sports
medicine by the BAS(E)M, the British Olympic
Association and the Physical Education Association.
28 Berridge, op. cit., note 13 above.
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Sports Injuries Clinics
In 1967 Bannister, then still the chair of the Research and Statistics Committee of the
SportsCouncil,hadameetingwiththegovernment’sChiefMedicalOfﬁcer,GeorgeGodber.
Thetopicwassportsinjuriesclinics,orrathertheneedtogatherstatisticalinformationabout
the demand and need for specialized treatment in the UK.29 This, plus Molyneux’s brieﬁng
document, inspired the project grant to Browne, of £1,000 in the ﬁrst instance, which was
increased as the project was extended in the early 1970s.30 The project involved a survey
sent to sports clubs and athletes, which was supposed to provide ﬁgures on the prevalence
and bodily location of sports injuries, list the treatments given, and make some estimation
of the social cost of injuries (in terms of time off work, etc.). At ﬁrst only injuries in rugby
and football were considered, with the terms of reference extended in 1971 to eleven other
sports, from amateur boxing to diving.31
Armed with more facts and ﬁgures on the prevalence, and apparent poor treatment,
of sports injuries, Bannister approached Godber again in 1971.32 Godber subsequently
appointed a small group of civil servants to investigate the possibility of forming SICs
within the NHS.33 Even at this point the representatives of the DHSS were ﬁrmly sceptical
about claims that athletes needed or deserved special treatment. The leading ﬁgure in the
DHSS’s inquiries, Dr Michael J Prophet, suggested that there were actually two reasons
why sports injuries appeared to get poor treatment. It was possible that athletes needed
specialist treatment, which was not comprehensively available on the NHS, but it was more
likely, he suggested, that there was a general failing in the treatment of soft tissue injuries
of all kinds. With these ideas in mind he set out to visit “a few places to see how injuries
and particularly sports injuries are managed and to discuss with the clinicians the needs in
this area”.34
Prophet interviewed Browne, four surgeons (mostly in orthopaedics) who were known
for working with athletes, and the current and ex-honorary secretaries of the BAS(E)M,
Dr Peter Sperryn and Dr JGPW illiams. He also spoke to representatives of the British
Olympic Association. What Prophet and the other civil servants involved in the SIC project
found overwhelming was the level of “politics” involved in sports medicine. Briefed and
counter-briefed by tense practitioners, and aware of competing interests in health and sport
at the highest ministerial levels, one adviser wrote to another that “the politics surrounding
this subject are diverse and deep. I have been warned to tread warily”.35
29 Sports Council Papers, SC(RS)(68)3, note of
a meeting held at the Ministry of Health, 19 Nov.
1967.
30 Sports Council Papers, SC(RS)(69), Research
and Statistics Committee Minutes, 8 July 1969.
31 Sports Council Papers, SC(RS)(71)22, ‘A
proposal from the Nufﬁeld Department of Industrial
Health … for an extension of the pilot study on sports
injuries’, 11 June 1971.
32 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Roger Bannister
to George Godber, 27 Oct. 1971; Notes of a meeting
re. Sports Injuries, 26 Nov. 1971.
33 It is not clear from the archive material exactly
who was involved in this group, which appears
to have been put together relatively informally.
Correspondence about the issue is shared between
four doctors: Dr M J Prophet, Dr Catherine N Dennis,
Dr Archibald and Dr Yellowlees.
34 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Dr C N Dennis to
Drs Archibald, Yellowlees and M J Prophet, 3 Dec.
1971.
35 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Dr M J Prophet
to Dr C N Dennis, n.d. (early 1972). See also a
handwritten note from Dr M J Prophet to Dr Laylock,
20 Dec. 1973, “The politics, the suggestion of rivalry
among the groups associated [with] Sport is
incredible. We must proceed [with] care + caution”.
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The consensus of all the witnesses was that the Sports Council’s scheme was a bad idea,
althoughtheyhadquitedifferentreasonsforarguingthiscase.Ontheonehand,thesurgeons
said (as Prophet had expected they would) that if sports injuries were not getting the care
they needed, then this was symptomatic of a general failure in accident and emergency,
soft tissue and orthopaedic services. If money and will were available, they should be put
towards improving these services for everyone, rather than picking out a select part of this
patient group for special treatment. On the other hand, the sports doctors offered objections
which were more speciﬁc to the planning and organization of the Sports Council’s scheme.
Sperryn “felt that the [demand] for general physical medicine was such that time and space
did not allow for an extra load”.36 Williams argued more bluntly that there were not enough
sports medicine experts available in the UK for a large enough SIC programme to be
set up, and that to run such SICs without expert supervision would invalidate the results
produced.
The DHSS team therefore remained to be convinced that athletes deserved special treat-
ment, since, as Prophet wrote around 1971: “I would personally give priority to a window
cleaner with a sprained ankle sustained at work over a bank clerk with a similar injury that
occurred in a football match.”37 If they did need special treatment this should be provided
privately, not on the NHS: “[I]t would probably be sensible for an individual, especially if
he were a professional sportsman, to take out an insurance policy to cover all eventualities
if he feels that he merits special attention.”38 The Sports Council, however, remained com-
mitted to a SIC scheme, which they decided to pursue even without formal support from
the DHSS.
TounderstandthereasonfortheSportsCouncil’spersistence, itisimportanttoremember
that the SIC scheme was discussed by the Council as if it were a corollary to Browne’s
work; it is described as a “supplementary project … look[ing] at the same problem from
the hospital end”.39 These clinics were not primarily intended to provide treatment and cure
(though that was a welcome side-effect), but rather to produce facts and ﬁgures on the types
and extent of injuries, the sorts of people who would make use of such clinics, and the
social cost of sports injuries. This is a crucial point in understanding the difference between
the Sports Council’s and the BAS(E)M’s conceptualizations of a SIC at the time. Although
the Sports Council “hoped that the clinics themselves [would] provide quicker and better
treatment for injured sportsmen than is currently available … [t]he ultimate purpose of the
project is to make out a case for improved treatment of sports injuries in particular, and soft
tissue injuries in general”.40
TheagreedmodelforaSportsCouncilSIC,aslaidoutindocumentsfromFebruary1972,
would run as if it was “a 24-hour casualty department, under a consultant orthopaedic sur-
geon with an interest in sports injuries, where injured sportsmen can be seen quickly …
[with a] quick referral to a consultant in physical medicine working at the same hospital”.41
This schema acted to disqualify a large number of active members of the BAS(E)M. It
36 NA, MH166/1394, letter ‘Special clinics for
athletes’ from Dr M J Prophet to Drs Archibald and
Yellowlees, 4 May 1972.
37 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Dr M J Prophet
to Dr C N Dennis, n.d. (c.1972).
38 Ibid.
39 Sports Council Papers, draft copy of the annual
report 1972–3.
40 Sports Council Papers, SC(IR)(73)6.
41 NA, MH166/1394, letter from B J Rees (Sports
Council) to Dr Ower (DHSS), 25 June 1973.
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excluded anyone working in the community, outside hospitals; more signiﬁcantly it placed
control directly in the hands of surgeons rather than physicians or other specialists—this
at a time when BAS(E)M members were as likely to be physiotherapists as they were
surgeons.42 Williams, for example, was not invited to take part in the scheme; as a practi-
tioner in a rehabilitative unit he did not qualify under the criteria. Sperryn turned down an
invitation to participate; as a consultant in physical medicine he could have taken referrals
from a SIC, but did not believe the Hillingdon orthopaedic surgeons would be interested in
joining the Sports Council scheme.
The failure to involve either Williams or Sperryn is interesting given that both were
actively running their own SICs at this time, as were many other BAS(E)M members, few
of whom had anything to do with the Sports Council’s scheme. When the DHSS was still
investigating the matter, Prophet had drawn up a list of men he considered national experts
in sports injuries—in 1972 this consisted of just eight names.43 Of these, only two were
included in the Sports Council’s SIC project. Although a clinic was opened at Guy’s, it was
not organized by the local expert, Hugh Burry (an ex-All Black, FRCP, and convener of
the BAS(E)M’s research group on Sudden Death in Sport), at least in part because he was
a consultant in physical medicine, and not a surgeon, although he did give “advice on the
administrative aspects of the clinics’ operations”.44
Initially, the Sports Council budgeted £4,250 to cover the administrative costs of six to
eight clinics, all of which had to agree to use standardized patient record forms. Eventually
a dozen clinics were opened, but of these half closed within ﬁve years. Worries voiced by
BAS(E)M members about the stability and reliability of clinics not staffed by sports medi-
cineenthusiastsseemedwellfounded.1,636patientrecordswerereturnedonastandardized
form, and in 1974 the Sports Council employed the medical statistician Dr K Kingsbury to
analyse these results.
Sports Injuries vs. Sports Medicine
Kingsbury published the results of the SIC scheme in a long report, The Sports Council
pilot study of sport injury clinics in 1976. A third of patients had sustained their injuries
playing football, nearly a quarter playing rugby, and a little over a sixth during athletics.
Most emphatically these were amateur sportspeople, “ordinary club or casual players …
Manywerestudentsandschool-children…only8%wereinternationaland3%professional
players”.45 Professional and international players, and patients in higher socio-economic
groupswereclearlygettingdifferentsortsofsportsmedicine;youngpeopleand“lessserious
sportsmen” were found more often in the SICs in casualty departments compared with the
wealthier and “more serious” sportsmen, whose GPs tended to refer them to rheumatology
42 Of a list of just over 450 BAS(E)M members
from 1968, of those whose qualiﬁcations are stated,
over 150 were physicians, and between twenty and
twenty-ﬁve either surgeons or members of the
Association of Chartered Physiotherapists. Anon.,
‘List of members’, British Journal of Sports Medicine
(hereafter BJSM), 1968, 3: 96–104.
43 Mr J Buck (Brook General Hospital),
Dr H Burry (Guy’s), Dr I Curwen (Queen Mary’s),
Mr A McDougal (Victoria Inﬁrmary, Glasgow),
Dr K Lloyd (United Cardiff Hospitals), Dr J Blonstein
(Amateur Boxing Association), Dr P Sperryn,
D rJGPW illiams. NA, MH166/1394, letter from
Dr M J Prophet to Dr C N Dennis, 14 June 1972.
44 Sports Council Papers, SC(IR)(73)6.
45 NA, MH166/1394, ‘The Sports Council pilot
study of sport injury clinics’, p. 58.
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or orthopaedic units. The athletic body was, it appeared, already getting specialized
treatment:
Professional players seem to have found some answer[s] … They stood out as a group with a much
shorter average history of symptoms, less incapacity and fewer chronic lesions. This suggests that
their need to return to sport quickly had established an awareness of the value of expert, hospital
attention, and where to obtain it.46
Thereport’soverallconclusionisthatsportsinjurieswere“abroad,communityproblem”.47
“The difﬁculty appears to lie”, argues the report, “in the routine care of acute soft tissue
injuries as a whole, rather than in the care of sport injuries speciﬁcally.”48 The Sports
Council tried to reformulate this to promote, still, the idea of SICs, suggesting that they
could perform a useful function by gathering together experts in soft tissue injuries and
rehabilitation,andformingalocusforthestandardizationoftreatmentandtheproperfollow-
up of injuries. Sports, they argued, caused a disproportionate number of such injuries, and
therefore athletes suffered disproportionately because of the poor treatment of these lesions
in the NHS.
The DHSS was unconvinced, especially about the value of naming such places “sports
injuries clinics” if they were really “soft tissue injury clinics”. “In these hard times,” wrote
one DHSS representative, the title ‘Sports Injuries Clinic’ “could be seen as a way round
the orthopaedic waiting lists, and experience surely should be available to all who need
it”.49 In addition to their unwillingness to draw special attention to a group of patients
who did not share a speciﬁc lesion or disease, the DHSS was also wary of the “politics”
of sports medicine: “[T]here are people who are pressing for ‘Sports Injury Clinics’ who
are not necessarily totally persona grata. Thus the name tends to get muddled with the
personality.”50
The instability and short-lived nature of many of the Sports Council’s SICs meant that
as physical institutions they were no threat to the better established and longer-running
informal SICs and “ghost clinics” provided for all levels of sportsmen and women by the
members of the BAS(E)M. The scheme did, however, have an important impact on the
organization and self-recognition of sports medicine in Britain, and was, as I will argue, a
keyfactorintheshiftbetweenthesportsmedicineofthe1950sand1960s, andthespecialty
ofSportandExerciseMedicineasitwasredeﬁnedinthe1980sand1990s.Theﬁrstchallenge
the SIC scheme posed was one of authority and territory within the British political sphere.
The second, more subtly, was a challenge to the internal, rhetorical, justiﬁcation for sports
medicine as a discrete area of medical expertise.
Although the Sports Council repeatedly described the SIC scheme as a fact-gathering
exercise, which could be used to encourage the NHS to provide sports medicine to the
public,thepracticalramiﬁcationsoftheschemewerethattheCouncilwasengagingdirectly
in the organization and provision of health care. This was clearly edging into the territory
46 Ibid., p. 61.
47 Ibid., p. 68.
48 Ibid., p. 62.
49 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Dr Jane Richings
to Miss P M C Winterton, 28 Jan. 1976.
50 NA, MH166/1394, letter from Dr Nichols to
Dr Jane Richings, 1 March 1976.
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which had previously been the entire domain of the BAS(E)M. Further, through its close
engagement with the DHSS, and more successfully with the Department of Environment
(where the Minister for Sport and Recreation was based), the Sports Council established its
positionasaconsultativebodyforsportsmedicineandsportsscienceintheUK.51 By1976,
when the British Government was asked to respond to a questionnaire sent by the Council
of Europe about sports medicine provision, the DHSS decided that
since the Sports Council is a semi-ofﬁcial body and has recently been taking a considerable interest
in this subject, it would be adequate to take advice from them, rather than going to the [BAS(E)M]
and the International Federation of Sports Medicine, both of which bodies have vested interests in
what the Council of Europe recommends.52
ThattheSportsCouncilmightbecomethebodywhichautomaticallyreceivedgovernmental
inquiries about sports medicine was clearly a worry for organizations like the BAS(E)M.
Even worse, the outcomes of the SIC project seemed to portray a form of sports medicine
withominousrepercussionsforthefutureofthedisciplineintheUK.TheSportsCouncilhad
drawntheDHSS’sattentiontosportsmedicine,butthensingularlyfailedtodemonstratethat
itwasarealornaturaldivisionofmedicinewhichshouldconcerntheNHS.TheDepartment
appeared convinced at the end of the project that the public needed better general soft tissue
services, while the elite athlete—if he or she needed “special” treatment at all—could, if
necessary, purchase private health care.
A second problem was use of the hospitals as focal points. Of the twelve Sports Council
SICs, eleven were based in hospitals, while one was at the Joint Service Medical Rehab-
ilitation Unit in Surrey. The importance of the hospital to claims for specialty status is
welldocumentedelsewhere, asisthe150-yearconﬂictbetweenthecommunitypractitioner
and the hospital consultant.53 Of Prophet’s list of sports injuries experts a quarter were
based in the community. Presumably had his list been of sports medicine experts, this pro-
portion would not only have been larger but would also have contained people who were
neither doctors nor surgeons. The Sports Council’s decision to consider sports clinics only
in the hospital rather than in rehabilitation centres, GP practices or other community sites
(i.e. sports centres) was complicated by its insistence that these clinics should be headed
by a surgeon. Again, of Prophet’s list of sports injuries experts, six of the eight were
physicians, not surgeons. The BAS(E)M, of course, represented orthopaedic surgeons and
hospital consultants in other ﬁelds, but it was also an important spokes-organization for
physiotherapists, rheumatologists, general practitioners and many other medial profession-
als who found themselves at the margins of, or entirely excluded from, the Sports Council’s
project.
51 The attitude of the Department of the
Environment, and particularly of Denis Howell,
Minister of Sport and Recreation, 1974–9, to the
SIC scheme was quite different to that of the DHSS.
Howell’s advocacy of the NHS’s role in providing
sports medicine (and not just sports injuries care)
did not always match the line taken within the DHSS
itself. See, for example, NA, MH166/1394, letter from
Dr Archibald to Dr J Richings, 24 June 1976, and the
various materials relating to the Department of the
Environment’s records on Research into Sport,
Exercise and Health: NA, AT60/65.
52 NA, MH166/1394, letter from
Miss P M C Winterton to Mr Hertzmark, 10 May
1976.
53 Anne Digby, The evolution of British general
practice, 1850–1948, Oxford University Press, 1999;
Granshaw, op. cit., note 2 above; Honigsbaum,
op. cit., note 1 above; C Lawrence, ‘Incommunicable
knowledge: science, technology and the clinical art in
Britain, 1850–1914’, J. Contemp. Hist., 1985, 20:
303–20.
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Finally, there was the reduction of “sports medicine” to “sports injuries”. By the 1970s
the BAS(E)M represented a diverse range of medical practices as well as practitioners. Not
onlydidtheSportsCouncil’smodeleffectivelydisenfranchisesigniﬁcantpartsofthesports
medicine community, but it was also using its relationship with government to promote an
image of sports medicine which was actively unhelpful to the BAS(E)M’s future plans. The
danger was that the Kingsbury report could be—indeed was by the DHSS—interpreted to
mean that the average person had no need of sports medicine services, and that these, as
a specialist service, had no place in the NHS. From this viewpoint, sports medicine for
the body public could be disaggregated into orthopaedic surgery, general rehabilitation and
better soft tissue injury treatment, while specialist services would be targeted at a limited
andmoreandmorereﬁnedpoolofeliteathletes, probablyviaprivateinsuranceandwithout
the NHS.54
This was not the specialism envisioned by the BAS(E)M, and its members immediately
began to refute the conclusions of the Sports Council. Sperryn and Williams were amongst
the ﬁrst BAS(E)M members actively to take this on, co-writing a widely cited article in
the British Medical Journal in 1975 arguing that the problem of sports injuries “[c]annot
effectively be solved by the organization of special clinics for sportsmen based on existing
services. There is a case for establishing regional or area clinics manned by appropriately
trained, recognized, and committed specialists”.55
This model of new, specialized clinics, staffed by “specialists” (not general orthopaedic
surgeons), was the dominant one promoted by the BAS(E)M as it began to argue for sports
medicine to become a formal specialty. The suggestions that, ﬁrstly, the lay body did not
need sports medicine experts, and, secondly, that the athletic body could be adequately
served by the private health-care industry were also countered, and I will turn to those
debates shortly. Before that I will brieﬂy discuss further threats to BAS(E)M-style sports
medicine, an economic threat from without, and a professional threat from within.
Regulating Sports Medicine: Insurance and BATS
The Sports Council’s scheme was not the ﬁrst attempt to open sports clinics in the UK.
In the late 1950s the BAS(E)M had tried to organize a SIC at the Middlesex Hospital to run
on Saturday evenings for patients who were able to bring “a note from [their] Secretary or
Captain”.56 This was clearly aimed more at organized amateurs than leisure sports, and ran
for only a year, closing in 1958 due to low attendance at the weekend. The Middlesex Hos-
pitalwaschosenasitwasalreadythesiteofwhatwasprobablytheﬁrstNHSsportsinjuries
clinic, founded by the Accident Ofﬁcer Dr Woodard, who was also involved with the Ama-
teur Athletics Association.57 Specialist facilities for elite or professional players certainly
54 The vision of the Sports Council and the
BAS(E)M was more successfully drawn together in
the late 1970s; see NA, AT60/65.
55 P N Sperryn andJGW illiams, ‘Why sports
injuries clinics’, Br. Med. J., 1975, 3: 364–5, on
p. 364, emphasis added.
56 BAS(E)M papers, SA/BSM/A/2/1, minutes of
the executive committee, 29 April 1957.
57 The records that remain of the Middlesex
Hospital do not contain any reference to Woodard’s
clinic in 1947 or 1948, but accounts from those who
worked there in later years suggest that it was running
in the late 1940s. University College London NHS
Foundation Trust Archives, minutes of the Board of
Governors.
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pre-date this clinic; by the inter-war period most (professional) Association Football clubs
engaged a medical ofﬁcer and employed a range of medical auxiliaries for the treatment
of their players, sometimes in very extensive rehabilitation “clinics” or rooms at their
home ground.58 In the late nineteenth century a hydropathic institute at Matlock House,
Manchester, became so well known for its athlete-centric treatments that it was popularly
referred to as the “footballers’ hospital”, treating the strains and sprains of footballers and
othersportsmenwitharangeofphysical, pharmacologicalandpsychologicalapproaches.59
Specialized facilities were the exception rather than the rule for most of the twenti-
eth century as access to expert care was largely limited to professional and “serious”
athletes. This changed after 1970 with a boom in sports medicine clinics, many outside
the NHS, catering as often to the amateur exerciser as to the elite performance athlete.
Sports injuries clinics, a text-book on the treatment of common sports disorders, published
in 1984, lists in an appendix twenty-eight NHS sports injuries clinics, alongside ﬁfteen
“private” physiotherapy clinics which specialized in sports injuries.60 In 1986 Running
Magazine published its own “selection” of sports medicine clinics, listing thirty NHS and
thirty-threeprivatemedicalclinics, alongsideﬁfteenprivatephysiotherapist-ledfacilities.61
Around the same time, the BAS(E)M organized a survey of clinics, publishing its Register
of Sports Injury and Physiotherapy Clinics in 1987, listing 137 centres across the country.
In the second 1990 edition 250 clinics were listed, with “more details” on 220 of those
appearing in the third edition, published in 1993.62
These clinics ranged widely, with those in the NHS typically being temporal rather than
physical (i.e. specifying a particular time when sports injuries would be prioritized) or
based on personnel (an in-house expert would be preferentially allocated sports medicine
queries). Private clinics could be more extensive and permanently available. Some clinics
alsohadstrongacademicandresearchlinks;1978sawthefoundingofaSICattheUniversity
of Manchester, for students in the ﬁrst place, but eventually taking in local athletes of
international standing.63 The ﬁrst Sports Medicine Fellow, Dr Sylvia Lachmann, was also
appointed in 1978 to New Hall (now Murray Edwards College), Cambridge, leading to the
formation of an associated SIC at Addenbrooke’s Hospital.64
While those running clinics within the NHS complained about the lack of support, those
outside the NHS faced even more serious threats. In particular, the ambiguous status
of sports medicine caused problems with medical insurance companies, as many ﬁrms
struggled to rationalize their payouts for sports medical treatment. As an example, in 1984
the New Allied Medical Insurance Company asserted that their usual policy was to recog-
nize a doctor as a specialist only if he or she held or had held a consultancy post in an NHS
hospital; this could exclude many expert sports medicine practitioners, as there were no
58 D F Featherstone, ‘Medicine and sport’,
Practitioner, 1953, 170: 299–302; W G S Pepper,
A T Fripp and W E Tanner, ‘Injuries to the
professional association footballer’, Practitioner,
1950, 164: 298–305.
59 M Randal Roberts, ‘A footballers’ hospital’,
Windsor Magazine, March 1899: 511–16.
60 John King (ed.), Sports injury clinic, London,
Pelham Books, 1987.
61 Anon., ‘How to ﬁnd a sports injury clinic’,
Running Magazine, 1986, 68: 46.
62 P Sperryn, ‘Editorial: BASM’s clinic register’,
BJSM, 1993, 27: 219.
63 C S B Galasko, et al., ‘University of Manchester
Sports Injury Clinic’, BJSM, 1982, 16: 23–6.
64 NA, FD23/4515, ‘Medical research and sport’,
outline proposals for the Cambridge project, n.d.
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consultantpostsin“sportsmedicine”, andmostBAS(E)Mmembersdidnotholdconsultan-
cies.65 Individual practitioners were able to negotiate recognition in a variety of ways, but
regularmomentsofstatusinsecurity—mostacuteforthosewhoreliedonprivatehealth-care
payments for their entire income—obviously inspired a desire to ﬁnd some standardized
way to identify experts in sports medicine.
The market in sports medicine clinics also caused some of those who did not have to
rely on income from private health plans to argue for formal systems of recognition. Since
it was not a specialism, anyone with an appropriate medical qualiﬁcation could claim
expertise in sports medicine, and there was no compulsion or obligation for them to join
the BAS(E)M. According to established sports medicine practitioners, the public needed
protecting from “unqualiﬁed ‘back street’ sports injuries clinics”.66 It was essential to
safeguard sports medicine’s reputation as some articles began to be published criticizing
it as a “pseudospecialty”, based on the false premise that sportsmen and women formed a
coherent patient sub-category.67 Without formal regulation or a speciﬁc educational path it
was reputed to “harbou[r] some quacks and charlatans”.68 The pressing question was: who
or what should be the arbiter of quality in sports medicine?
The BAS(E)M’s embrace of scientists, physiotherapists and sporting professionals as
members placed limitations on its ability to function as a direct representative of and,
if necessary, advocate for, registered medical practitioners. As demand for systems of
recognition and regulation grew, so did pressure for the formation of an organization that
could speciﬁcally guard the interests of doctors. The ﬁrst attempt to do so was closely
associatedwiththeproblemsofinsurancepaymentsintheprivatesector. In1980theBritish
Association of Trauma in Sport (BATS) was founded by four BAS(E)M members. The aim
wasto“ﬁllavacuumbecause[BAS(E)M]hadnoteethorcapacitytoprovidesportsmedicine
totheinjuredathlete…buildingup[tofullprimarycare]stepbystepfromasmallstartwith
softtissueinjuries”.69 Thiswastobeachievedthroughanon-commercialinsurancescheme
run through a “completely professional body”—i.e. the BATS—open only to registered
medical practitioners.70
The BATS was immediately contentious. The honorary secretary of the BAS(E)M, Peter
Sperryn, used his column in the British Journal of Sports Medicine to query the prob-
ity of the four founding members, who were all also medical advisers to an insurance
company which would be providing the medical insurance organized by the BATS.71 He
seemed to be suggesting that the overlap between those who would decide who was and
65 Personal papers of Dr Malcolm Read, letter
from New Allied Medical Insurance Co. to Malcolm
Read, 19 Jan. 1984. I would like to thank Dr Read for
allowing me access to his collection of materials
relating to sports medicine.
66 J E Davies, ‘Sports injuries and society’, BJSM,
1981, 15: 80–3.
67 R G Pringle, ‘Dangerous, meddlesome, wasteful
… sports medicine is a pseudo-specialty’, World
Medicine, 22 March 1980: 29–30.
68 J Jones, ‘Sports medicine and soft tissue
lesions’, in Hedley Berry, Eric Hamilton and
John Goodwill, Rheumatology and rehabilitation,
London, Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 127–38, on
p. 137.
69 BAS(E)M Papers, SA/BSM/A/2/2, minutes of
the executive committee, 12 Jan. 1981.
70 Members of the Association of Chartered
Physiotherapists in Sports could become associate
members.
71 P Sperryn, ‘Secretary’s column: unity or
fragmentation?’, BJSM, 1981, 15: 88–9.
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who was not an “expert” and those who stood to proﬁt by a successful insurance scheme
was unethical, although he was forced to withdraw his statements in a later edition of the
journal. Debates at BAS(E)M meetings about the BATS were heated, and in some cases
deliberately unminuted. In fact, the insurance scheme collapsed, and the BATS itself was
of limited long-term impact. Its founders claim that it had 150 or 160 members at its peak,
and ran until the late 1980s with conferences and symposia.72 Others point out that less
than 10 per cent of the membership turned up to most meetings.73 What the BATS did do
was, like the Sports Council’s SIC scheme, to throw a spotlight on the most vulnerable
points of sports medicine’s organization and practice in Britain at the time. The issue of
recognition, formal or otherwise, and the issue of doctor representation became central in
the later 1980s.
While the debates about the BATS were ongoing, the executive committee of the
BAS(E)M drew up a paper to consider the long-term future of the organization, which
was extensively discussed by the Association in 1982. The vision was federalism—instead
of a single mouthpiece, the BAS(E)M would become an umbrella organization collecting
together fractured special interest groups with common ground in sports medicine. Many
professional groups were gaining separate organizations for sports medicine (for example,
the Association of Chartered Physiotherapists in Sports Medicine, founded in 1972), while
doctors were one of the few groups not speciﬁcally represented anywhere. This federal
dream of the BAS(E)M, where organizations like the Association of Chartered Physiother-
apists in Sports, and even the BATS, could be brought under one superstructure, was never
realized. Yet, throughthelastdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyandintothetwenty-ﬁrst, spe-
cialistgroupswererepeatedlyfounded; asrecentlyas2001anattempttoturntheBAS(E)M
into a doctors-only organization led to the formation of the United Kingdom Association
of Doctors in Sports (UKADIS). In his ‘Case for [the BAS(E)M] to become a membership
organization … for doctors’, one co-founder makes the point clearly that “the only group
notrepresentedintheirownright(insportsmedicine)arethedoctors”.74 Andwhiledoctors
did not gain a specialist group, they did gain a specialty that protected their professional
interests.
Specialty: From Sports Medicine to
Sport and Exercise Medicine
Theunderlyingchangesthatmovedsportsmedicinefromanareaofexpertisetoaformal
medical specialty were essentially social. An increase in the proportion of the population
taking part in organized or regulated sporting activity can, paradoxically, go hand-in-hand
withanincreasinglysedentarypopulation, whereexerciseforhealthhasbecomeacorepart
of the public health message. And the sports which people were engaging with were often
relatively high-performance; fewer than a dozen annual marathons were run in England
before 1970, with 26 in 1980, rising to 47 when the ﬁrst London Marathon was run in
72 Reynolds and Tansey (eds), op. cit., note 22
above; see the evidence of Dr Davies in particular.
73 BAS(E)M Papers, SA/BSM/A/2/2, minutes of
an executive committee meeting, 23 June 1982.
74 BAS(E)M Papers, SA/BSM, ‘The case for
BASEM to become a membership organisation in
sport and exercise medicine for doctors’ by Malcolm
Read and Nick Webborn.
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1981—this had more than doubled to 115 marathons by 1983.75 As Sperryn and Williams
wrotein1975, “SportforAll”inevitablymeant“sportsinjuriesforall”, whichshouldmean
“sports medicine for all”—not just for injuries, but also, eventually, advice on training and
diet for the vastly increased numbers of long-distance runners, evening squash players and
weight-reducers.76
But while the external inﬂuences on sports medicine were entirely contextual, some
internal justiﬁcations followed familiar patterns in the history of specialization. The reg-
ulation of SICs, even though they represented only a fraction of the activity of sports
medicine, was important because it both reacted to the need to prove status to insurance
companies (a clear economic pressure) and adjusted the public image of sports medi-
cine by eliminating the “quacks”. It was the latter argument—public protection—which
appeared most prominently in public discussions; protecting the public from charlatans
and their “back street clinics” is part of a very long tradition of medical professionaliza-
tion.77 None the less, the role and signiﬁcance of private health care and insurance in sports
medicine made it particularly sensitive to competitive drives and commercial pressures,
perhaps more so than other specialisms in the UK. The DHSS seemed content, suggest-
ing that general health care could cope with the demand for sports medicine for the lay
body, with specialist treatment dealt with through club ﬁnances or personal insurance. The
BAS(E)M, on the other hand, proposed a more comprehensive arrangement, with sports
medicine fully embedded for all within the NHS, and properly regulated in the private
market.
One way to justify sports medicine’s place in the NHS was to frame it as part of a larger
argument about equity and access. Begging the question of whether it was a specialty at all,
the argument was made that given it was a specialty it should be available to everyone. In
particular,atatimewhensomegovernmentdepartmentswererecommendingthatthewhole
population should do more exercise, other departments should not be refusing specialist
care.Thispointwasperhapsmostunequivocallyspeltoutina1994BritishJournalofSports
Medicineeditorialwhichclaimedthatthe“government[was]hell-bentoncrassmaterialism
andtherecreationofDickensianpovertyinthere-emergingunderclasses”,inasocietywhere
“[p]ride in public provision is eroded by yuppy [sic] health gyms, expensive squash, golf
and swimming (and private sports medicine)”.78 It goes on to claim that privatization rarely
leads to cheaper facilities, and asks, “[h]ow are the underprivileged to play sport? ... what
about the ‘health’ aspects of ‘sport’ as we drop ‘for all’?”
A full discussion of the impact of changing public health policies and of the notion of
exercise for health on British sports medicine deserves its own article. The responsibility
of a government to provide care to support the exercise it was promoting fed into the third
changeinthewaysportsmedicinewasfeaturedinthisperiod,whichIhavediscussedatmore
lengthelsewhere;arhetoricofdrugs,prescriptionsanddoseswasappliedtoexercise.79 This
rhetoric described sports participation and gym use as an area of expert knowledge, which
75 Centre for Sports Science and History,
Birmingham University, NCLA II.M203.
N McGuinness, ‘A study of the temporal and regional
aspects of the English marathon between 1908 and
1985, with suggested explanations for trends
uncovered’, Birmingham, Social Sciences
dissertation, n.d.
76 Sperryn and Williams, op. cit., note 55 above.
77 See, in particular, Roberts, op. cit., note 15
above.
78 P Sperryn, ‘Sport for all—or all for sport?’,
BJSM, 1994, 28: 219.
79 Heggie, op. cit., note 14 above.
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could literally be prescribed to a variety of patient groups. Used successfully, exercise
promoted health; used wrongly, overused, or used inappropriately, exercise could cause
disease, injury and even death. This was a powerful way for practitioners whose specialism
was based on the concept of an elite athletic body to extend their expertise and knowledge
to the wider body public.
Conclusion
Weiszhassuggestedthatmanyspecialisms“gained[their]initialandprimaryjustiﬁcation
as a form of knowledge production and dissemination”.80 I cannot make such a claim
for sports medicine, since, although teaching and research became key to the process of
specialty formation, these were a consequence of the structure of specialty recognition in
the UK, rather than acting as direct drivers for reform in and of themselves. The provision
of a diploma, or other qualiﬁcation, in sports medicine could act as a clear marker of
expertise, and so when there was demand for such a qualiﬁcation, there was a rush by a
variety of organizations to provide (and therefore control) it. By 1989 any doctor interested
in sports medicine had three different postgraduate diplomas to choose from; a part-time
BAS(E)Mcourse, afull-timepartlyBAS(E)M-sponsoredcourseattheNationalInstituteof
Sports Medicine, and one under the aegis of the Institute of Sports Medicine at the London
Hospital. Any of these, with the addition of a dissertation and some other requirements,
would permit a candidate to sit exams and qualify with a Diploma in Sports Medicine
recognized by the Society of Apothecaries.81 A “necessarily distinct training path” is one
requirement for specialty recognition in the UK, so once this was in place it was possible
for sports medicine organizations to campaign for sports medicine to become a formal
specialty.82 An Intercollegiate Academic Board of Sport and Exercise was put together in
1998, and created a working party to apply for specialty status in 2003. Their application
was submitted in 2004, and the specialty of Sport and Exercise Medicine was formally
recognized the following year.83
Between 1970 and the mid-1980s the representatives of sports medicine in Britain
changed direction on the question of specialty formation. This article has discussed in
detail two factors in that shift; ﬁrst, the Sports Council’s SIC scheme, which drew political
attention to a deﬁnition of sports medicine (or rather, sports injuries) that did not suit the
needs of many sports medicine practitioners. Second was the issue of insurance and of
practitioner-only organizations, where registered medical practitioners demanded proper
representation to help prove their expertise and to protect their professional interests. These
examplesshoulddemonstratethatthespecializationofsportsmedicinewasamany-faceted
process—it was about economics, and authority, and status, and NHS policy, and major
social changes in leisure and health consumption.
British sports medicine did not face organized forms of opposition, suggesting alterna-
tive technical interventions, treatment modalities, or even sources of overall expertise and
80 Weisz, op. cit., note 3 above, p. xxi.
81 Anon., ‘Diploma in sports medicine (Society of
Apothecaries)’, BJSM, 1989, 23: 61–2.
82 NA, MH166/1394, letter from W M Hollyhock
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83 Donald A D Macleod, ‘Intercollegiate Board
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473Vanessa Heggie
authority. (AlltheSICswere, afterall, runbyregisteredmedicalpractitionerswhoreliedon
the Royal College of Surgeons or of Physicians for ultimate sanction.) No one organization
ever seemed to be, for more than a brief moment, a serious threat to the BAS(E)M’s role as
themajorrepresentativeandspokes-organizationofsportsmedicinepractitionersintheUK.
TherewasadangerofthecompletedisappearanceanddisaggregationoftheBAS(E)Minto
a federalist structure, of sports medicine being absorbed into the generalized health care for
themassofthepopulation, andofaspecialismﬁtonlyforatinypoolofeliteathleticbodies.
These were not groundless fears. The scenario played out in the late twentieth century in
the USA resulted in a situation where sports medicine now exists only as a set of fractured
sub-disciplines, not a holistic specialty.84
The Sports Council’s SIC scheme acted to highlight the vulnerabilities of sports medi-
cine in the 1970s. Issues of expertise, education and authority were brought to the fore,
and mapped out over well-established tensions between hospital and community, con-
sultant and general practitioner, doctors and the professions allied to medicine. Sports
medicine could retreat into private practice, cling to the elite athletic body which had
deﬁned sports medicine since the 1950s, or it could ﬁnd a way of justifying its place in
the NHS and of embracing both the leisure revolution and the new idea of exercise as a
curative and preventive medical intervention. The organizations of British sports medicine
explicitly and deliberately took the latter path: “We must look beyond the physiologi-
cally interesting freaks of elite sport”, read a British Journal Sports Medicine editorial
in 1993, “to lay claim to the broader ﬁeld of sports medicine with its general health
beneﬁts.”85 That sports medicine managed to change quite radically the internal rhetor-
ical justiﬁcation for its expertise while maintaining its integrity was made possible by its
embracing the formal structures, academic systems and registration which had earlier been
rejected.
Thespecializationofsportsmedicinewasthereforeacomplicatedprocessofexternaland
internal pressures, of economic, social, and political needs. Perhaps the only comparable
study is that of the specialization of clinical genetics, because although Peter Coventry
and John Pickstone do not speciﬁcally delineate the same pattern of specialty formation
as I have outlined here, there is a clear similarity.86 Clinical genetics was a discipline
which grounded itself in a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation in the 1950s and 1960s, and, like sports
medicine, successfully expanded the territory of its expertise in the 1970s. This, as is
the case for sports medicine, was driven by the internal politics of the NHS’s changing
health policy. I would add to this account that shifting public attitudes, and demands for
genetic testing, also inﬂuenced change. That there are similarities between what appear
to be two quite differently organized and justiﬁed biomedical specialties suggests that the
information given on one aspect of late-twentieth-century specialization may prove useful
in considerations and reconsiderations not only of the process of specialization in medicine
as a whole, but also in the sciences more broadly.87
84 It is a sub-specialty in the larger ﬁelds of
emergency medicine, family medicine, internal
medicine, orthopaedic surgery, paediatrics and
physical medicine and rehabilitation.
85 Editorial, ‘Sports medicine and national ﬁtness’,
BJSM, 1993, 27:3 .
86 Coventry and Pickstone, op. cit., note 6 above.
87 Especially since even recent studies on specialty
formation in the sciences eschew references to
material from specialization in medicine; see K Brad
Wray, ‘Rethinking scientiﬁc specialization’, Soc.
Stud. Sci., 2005, 35: 151–64.
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